Public Law: Consumer Law by Hersbergen, Ronald L.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 37 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1975-1976 Term: A Symposium
Winter 1977
Public Law: Consumer Law
Ronald L. Hersbergen
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Ronald L. Hersbergen, Public Law: Consumer Law, 37 La. L. Rev. (1977)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol37/iss2/17




Most disclosure statements given to customers or prospective custom-
ers pursuant to Title I of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act of
19681 contain an acknowledgment of receipt thereof to be signed by the
consumer. Where liability for an alleged failure by the creditor to disclose is
asserted against an assignee of the underlying obligation, acknowledgment
of receipt can be conclusive proof that the required disclosure statement was
delivered to the person entitled under the law to receive it.2 In failure to
disclose actions involving the original creditor in a transaction secured by an
interest in real property, the acknowledgment creates no more than a
rebuttable presumption that the disclosure statement was delivered. 3 In
other cases involving the original creditor, the act does not expressly
provide any presumptions or burden of proof revolving around a signed
acknowledgment, and in such cases the First Circuit has said in College
Park Credit Corporation v. Aitkens4 that the burden of proof is as in any
other case.5 One of the defendant borrowers in Aitkens testified that he had
no recollection of the loan transaction; the other testified that she had kept
all the papers relative to the transaction in a folder, but that no copy of the
disclosure statement resided therein. Neither denied that a copy of the
disclosure statement was received. The First Circuit, treating the acknow-
ledgment as prima facie proof of delivery of the required disclosures,
affirmed the ruling of the trial judge that the defendants' testimony was not
sufficient to rebut the plaintiff's evidence of delivery.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1970).
2. Id. § 1641. The acknowledgment may also, under § 1641, be conclusive proof
that the statement complies with the statute, insofar as liability of the assignee is
concerned. Summary judgment for an assignee may be appropriate. See Chrysler
Credit Corp. v. Barnes, 126 Ga. 444, 191 S.E.2d 121 (Ga. App. 1972). Assignees may
lose the presumption as to compliance if there is a violation of the disclosure
requirements "apparent on the face" of the disclosure statement. 15 U.S.C. § 1641
(1970); Austin v. Ohio Furniture Co., CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 99,610 (N.D. Ohio
1970) (Transfer Binder).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(c) (1970). Cf. Gillard v. Aetna Fin. Co., 414 F. Supp. 737
(E.D. La. 1976).
4. 317 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
5. As a general matter, the federal act does not disturb local law-substantive
or procedural. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1610(a)-(b) (1970).
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In another Fourth Circuit case, the defendant-borrower who equivo-
cated about his signature on an acknowledgment of receipt clause not only
lost on that issue but also lost on his substantive charge that no disclosure
had been made to him, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1605(c). 6 But the court,
in Bud Finance Co. v. Gilardi,7 ruled that defendant did sign the acknowl-
edgment of receipt, held that defendant was presumed to know the contents
of the disclosure statement, the court stating "[o]ne cannot avoid an
obligation merely by contending that he had not read it, or that it was not
read and explained to him, or that he did not understand its provisions." 
8
While the rule that the signer of a written instrument is presumed to
know its contents is said by the Fourth Circuit to be well-established, 9
reliance on that principle in the Truth in Lending context is ill-advised in the
absence of consideration of other provisions of the law and of its regulatory
partner, Regulation Z. The act requires that disclosures be made "clearly
and conspicuously, [and] in accordance with the regulations of the [Federal
Reserve] Board";' ° and provides that the Board may permit use of
terminology different from that used in the Act itself." The Board, in
Regulation Z, adds the requirements that the disclosure must be made "in
meaningful sequence . . ., and at the time and in the terminology pre-
scribed in applicable sections"; 12 that where the terms "finance charge"
and "annual percentage rate" are required to be used, they are to be printed
'more conspicuously than other terminology required'';' 3 that while a
creditor may supply additional (i. e., non-required) information or explana-
tions with the required disclosures, "none shall be stated, utilized, or placed
so as to mislead or confuse the customer or contradict, obscure, or detract
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(c) (Supp. 1968) in relevant part states:
Charges or premiums for [credit] insurance ... , shall be included in the finance
charge unless a clear . . . statement . . . is furnished . . . stating that the
[consumer] . . . may choose the person through which the insurance is to be
obtained.
7. 330 So. 2d 622 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
8. Id. at 624.
9. The court cites Jayco Sales and Serv., Inc. v. Smith, 303 So. 2d 554 (La. App.
1 st Cir. 1974), and IdealLoan of New Orleans, Inc. v. Johnson, 218 So. 2d 6 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1969).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1631(a) (Supp. 1974).
11. Id. § 1632(a) (Supp. 1974).
12. 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(a) (1976). See Allen v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 531 F.2d 797
(7th Cir. 1976).
13. Id. The section also states that all numerical amounts and percentages "shall
be stated in figures and shall be printed in not less than the equivalent of 10 point type,
.075 inch computer type, or elite size typewritten numerals, or shall be legibly
handwritten."
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attention from the information required . . .to be disclosed";14 and that
any creditor electing to combine inconsistent disclosures required under
state law 5 with the federally required disclosures may do so only in
accordance with the format set forth in Reg. Z, § 226.6(c).' 6 In short, the
requirements of form are as important as those of substance in the Truth in
Lending context, 17 so that the statute and Regulation Z must have been
complied with in order to say, as in Gilardi, that the signer is presumed to
have read and understood the instrument signed. If those requirements have
not been met, it is no defense to liability under the act to show that the
document in fact contains the information required to be disclosed, or that
the signer in any event understood the contents of the document perfectly
and was not misled.
Three important issues of Truth in Lending law were also before the
Fourth Circuit in Termplan Mid-City, Inc. v. Laughlin:'8 first, whether a
defendant borrower may raise as a set-off the alleged failure of the creditor
to meet the requirements of Truth in Lending, where the alleged violations
would be prescribed under § 1640(e)' 9 of the act; second, whether a
creditor, to be in compliance with Reg. Z, § 226.8(d)(3),2 ° must disclose
that the finance charge includes only interest; and third, whether a statutor-
ily required rebate of unearned (precomputed) interest upon acceleration of
payment (or prepayment) is tantamount to an "additional charge upon
default" and required to be disclosed as such.
The Fourth Circuit found the first issue to be a relatively uncomplicated
application of Article 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which would
clearly permit a defendant to raise various prescribed claims as a set-off to
the amount due on a defaulted loan. 21 Whether Art. 424 would permit a
14. Id. § 226.6(c) (1976) (Emphasis added).
15. Id. § 226.6(b) (1976).
16. Id. § 226.6(c) (1976). The regulation also requires that all "inconsistent"
disclosures appear separately and below a conspicuous "demarcation line" and be
identified as such by a clear and conspicuous heading. Id. § 226.6(c)(2)(iii) (1976).
17. See, e.g., Pennino v. Morris Kirschman & Co., 526 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1976);
Powers v. Sims & Levin Realtors, 396 F. Supp. 12, 20 (E.D. Va. 1975); Ratner v.
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
18. 333 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1970).
20. The section required, where "applicable," the disclosure of "the total
amount of the finance charge, with [a] description of each amount included." By
amendment effective August 6, 1976, the section now requires disclosure of the total
amount of the finance charge "and where the total charge consists of two or more
types of charges, a description of the amount of each type." See 41 Fed. Reg.
28,945-46 (1976).
21. The court cites article 424, and Young v. Fremin-Smith, Inc., 265 So. 2d 341
[Vol. 37
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prescribed civil penalty for violations of Truth in Lending to be raised as a
set-off in a federal court, however, may not be as uncomplicated as it
appears. One decision suggests that in a federal court § 1640(e) is jurisdic-
tional;22 if that decision is correct, this part of the Termplan case bears
re-evaluation.
With regard to the second problem of disclosures of a single-
component finance charge, the Fourth Circuit held, in reliance upon Gibson
v. Family Finance Corp. of Gentilly, Inc. ,23 and interpretations and staff
opinion letters of the Federal Reserve Board,24 that a description of each
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1972). The Fenton decision did not discuss § 1640(h), which
section, as amended, states: "A person may not take any action to offset any amount
for which a creditor is potentially liable to such person under subsection (a)(2) of this
section against any amount owing to such creditor by such person, unless the amount
of the creditor's liability to such person has been determined by judgment of a court
of competent jurisdiction in an action to which such person was a party." [Emphasis
added].
The Fourth Circuit subsequently has interpreted the section to mean that a § 1640
civil penalty claim could be determined by a Louisiana state court, as a court of
competent and concurrent jurisdiction, and set off by the consumer against the
creditor. See Reliable Credit Serv., Inc. v. Bernard, 339 So. 2d 952 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1976).
22. Fenton v. Citizens Sav. Ass'n, 400 F. Supp. 874 (C.D. Mo. 1975). The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal had the opportunity in Reliable Credit Serv., Inc. v. Bernard,
339 So. 2d 952 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976), to both reaffirm the set off portion of the
Termplan opinion, and to distinguish the Fenton decision on the basis that the federal
court was "simply passing on its own lack of jurisdiction," id. at 954, and that the
Fenton limitation emphasized initiation of a § 1640 claim.
23. 404 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. La. 1975).
24. The Board has taken the position that "opinion" or "advisory" letters
written by FRB staff members in response to inquiries from creditors, lawyers, or the
general public represent only "the informed view of the particular official responding
to the inquiry, who is authorized by the Board to express opinions on the particular
subject," and does not necessarily represent "the position the Board members
themselves would take if they formally considered the issue." FRB Letter of March
1, 1971, by Kenneth A. Kenyon, Deputy Secretary, in 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
30,640; FRB Letter of December 2, 1969, by J.L. Robertson, 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE
(CCH) 30,505. The Kenyon letter states, however, that the Board believes the
public "is entitled to rely on [an informal] staff opinion unless and until it is altered by
the Board after formal consideration." See also Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet,
Inc., 499 F.2d 971,978 (5th Cir. 1974); Bone v. Hibernia Bank, 493 F.2d 135,139(9th
Cir. 1974) (FRB construction of Regulation Z entitled to "deference"); Stefanski v.
Mainway Budget Plan, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 138 (S.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 456 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1972) (characterizing such correspondence as
"persuasive . . . [but] not binding authority as to questions of interpretations of
federal law"); Barksdale v. People's Fin'l Corp., 393 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Ga. 1975)
(FRB Interpretation of Regulation Z in opinion letter entitled to "great deference");
Bloomer v. McKnight Road Dodge, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 403 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (FRB
letters entitled to "great weight" as constituting part of the body of "informed
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amount included in the finance charge is necessary under Reg. Z, §
226.8(d)(3) 25 only when the total charge includes more than one element. 26
So, if the finance charge consists of only one element, e.g. interest, or
"time-price differential," a disclosure of the total dollar amount of that
charge, using the term "finance charge" would comply with §
226.8(d)(3)-there would be no requirement that the creditor disclose that
the single component comprising the finance charge is the only component
thereof. The opinion observes in a note to the text that the issue is not one on
which the various federal courts are in agreement, though one is inclined to
wonder why there should be a dispute on the issue when Reg. Z, §
226.8(d)(3) expressly states that a description of each amount included in
the finance charge is only required to be given where such an item of
information is "applicable" to the transaction.27
The third issue, arising by virtue of the requirements of the Louisiana
Consumer Credit Law, R.S. 9:3529, that unearned interest be rebated to the
borrower upon prepayment or acceleration of the debt, was also resolved by
the Fourth Circuit in favor of the creditor. Regulation Z, § 226.8(b)(4),
experience and judgment of the agency to whom Congress delegated appropriate
authority"). The United States Supreme Court has ruled, in reference, however, to
the FRB's Regulation Z itself, that "courts should defer to the informed experience
and judgment of the agency to whom Congress delegated appropriate authority,"
Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 372 (1973), but the status
of the informal staff opinion letter has grown in light of the Court's statement.
25. Compare 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(d)(3) (1976) with 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(6) (1970).
26. Four federal court decisions seemingly disagree with the conclusion reached
in Gibson; see Ives v. W. T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1975); Lewis v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 416 F. Supp. 514 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Johnson v.
Associates Fin., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D. III. 1974); Meyers v. Clearview Dodge
Sales, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 722, 726 (E.D. La. 1974). Adams v. New Haven U.L Fed.
Credit Union, 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,619 (D. Conn. 1975), St. Germain v.
Bank of Ha waii, 413 F. Supp. 587 (D. Hawaii 1976), and Bloomer v. McKnight Road
Dodge, 397 F. Supp. 403 (W.D. Pa. 1975), are in accord with Gibson. As amended,
§ 226.8(d)(3) would appear to adopt the Gibson consruction. See note 20, supra.
Compare Simmons v. American Budget Plan, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. La. 1974)
with Gillard v. Aetna Fin. Co., 414 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. La. 1976).
27. Cf. Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 499 F. 2d 971 (5th Cir. 1974).
Johnson v. Associates Fin., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1121, 1122 (S.D. Ill. 1974), adopts the
view that the failure to disclose interest as the only component of the finance charge
is a violation of the general "meaningfulness" standard of the law (15 U.S.C. § 1601).
The opinion does not mention the contrary position of the FRB Letters. The court is
probably wrong, since § 1601's "meaningful disclosure" language is a statement of
Congress's purpose in regard to the various required disclosures, which the act itself
says are required "to the extent applicable." See 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a) (1970). But see
Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 275 ("applicable"
equated with "relevant").
[Vol. 37
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requires that in any extension of credit other than open-end credit, the
creditor disclose "the amount, or method of computing the amount, of any
default, delinquency or similar charges payable in the event of late pay-
ments." Of course, where there exists the right of the creditor to accelerate
future installment payments, application of § 3529 of the Louisiana Con-
sumer Credit Law produces the following equation: late payments equals
default, which equals right to accelerate, which equals unearned interest,
which equals consumer's right to a rebate, all of which leads to the "Rule of
78's" or the "Sum of the Digits" method of computing that rebate.
Identification of the "method of computing any unearned portion of the
finance in the event of prepayment" is a required disclosure under Reg. Z, §
226.8(b)(7), and the battle over merely identifying that method as "The
Rule of 78's" versus an explanation of the rule is long concluded. 28 Those
who represent consumers also tried unsuccessfully to characterize the
method of computing the rebate, i.e., the Rule of 78's, as itself constituting
a "default, delinquency, or similar [charge] payable in the event of late
payments" under Reg. Z, § 226.8(b)(4) 2 9-presumably because the rebate
as calculated under the Rule of 78's can result in an amount rebated
considerably less than would result from, for example, a pro rata or actuarial
method of computation. 30 The argument in Termplan, whereby the
creditor's right to accelerate payment becomes a required disclosure under
28. See Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.818 (1976) (FRB interpretation of § 226.8(b)(7));
Bone v. Hibernia Bank, 493 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1974); McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank,
395 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Powers v. Sims & Levin Realtors, 396 F. Supp. 12
(E.D. Va. 1975). A decision from the Southern District of Illinois, Johnson v.
Associates Fin. Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D. I11. 1974), reverted to the contrary view
that a mere identification of the Rule of 78's has no meaning for consumers-a
position of some merit-but the court itself attempts unsuccessfully to succinctly
explain the Rule in its own opinion, and the FRB Interpretation to the contrary was
ignored in the opinion.
29. See Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.818 (1976) (FRB interpretation of § 226.8(b)(7)
(1976); Bone v. Hibernia Bank, 493 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1974). Cf. Johnson v.
McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1975). The Fifth Circuit takes
the view that the right to accelerate is nota "default" charge under§ 226.8(b)(4). See,
e.g., McDaniel v. Fulton Nat. Bank, 4CONS. CRED. GUIDE(CCH) 98,562 (N.D. Ga.
1975); Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 539 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1976); Grant v.
Imperial Motors, 539 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1976); Martin v. Commercial Securities, 539
F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1976). See generally Hewson, Acceleration Clauses in Georgia:
Consumer Installment Contracts and the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act, 27 MERCER
L. REV. 969 (1976).
30. The rule of 78's also has been theorized as a "penalty charge" under Reg. Z,
12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(6) (1976). See Kenney v. Landis Fin's Group, Inc. 349 F. Supp.
939 (N.D. Iowa 1972). But the FRB and the Ninth Circuit disagree, see Reg. Z, 12
C.F.R. § 226.818 (1976), and Bone v. Hibernia Bank, 493 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1974).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Reg. Z, § 226.8(b)(4), is perhaps another extension of the same reasoning .31
In ruling against such a construction of Regulation Z, the Fourth Circuit
again relied upon a federal court decision32 and an FRB Staff opinion
letter. 33 As the court observes, however, there is considerable disagreement
on the issue ;34 but a failure to make the required rebate would in any event be
both a violation of the Louisiana Consumer Credit Law and a disclosable
"charge" for late payment under Reg. Z, § 226.8(b)(4).
THE LOUISIANA CONSUMER CREDIT LAW
The Louisiana Consumer Credit Law is a definition-oriented enact-
ment, section 3516 containing thirty-one key definitions. Even so, some
terms are not defined by the act, including "delinquency charge," "deferral
charge," "emergency" home solicitation sales, and "amicable" demand
by a creditor. The decision of the Second Circuit in Southern Equipment &
Tractor Co. v. McCullen,35 permits the inference that such words and terms
are not fatally vague, but rather will be viewed by the courts as words of
common usage, needing no interpretation beyond their plain meaning.
36
31. Yet another extension of the reasoning would say that a failure to disclose
the right to accelerate is a violation of the "meaningful disclosure" standard. See
Woods v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 395 F. Supp. 9, 16 (D. Ore. 1975); Meyers v. Clearview
Dodge Sales, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 722, 726 (E.D. La. 1974). Cf. Johnson v. Associates
Fin., Inc., 369 F. Supp 1121 (S.D. Il. 1974).
32. Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1975). See
also Frank v. Reserve Consumer Discount Co., 398 F. Supp. 703 (W.D. Pa. 1975);
Jones v. East Hill Ford Sales, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 402 (W.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd 532 F.2d
746 (3d Cir. 1976).
33. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(4) (1976); FRB Letter of October 22, 1974, by Frederick
Solomon, in 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,173. See also Jones v. East Hills Ford
Sales, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 402 (W.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd 532 F.2d 746 (3d Cir. 1976).
34. Some decisions are in accord with the no disclosure ruling of Termplan and
McCrackin-Sturman Ford. See St. Germain v. Bank of Hawaii, 413 F. Supp. 587 (D.
Hawaii 1976); Barrett v. Vernie Jones Ford, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 904 (N.D. Ga. 1975);
Washington Motor Sales v. Ferreira, 131 N.J. Super. 328, 329 A. 2d 599 (1974), aff'd
357 A.2d 17 (1976). Others appear to require a disclosure of the acceleration right,
apparently on the basis that without it, the consumer does not receive a "meaning-
ful" disclosure, see Kessler v. Associates Fin'l. Serv. Co., 405 F. Supp. 122 (D.
Hawaii 1975); Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. La.
1974); Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. III. 1972). For an
excellent discussion of the evolution of the issue, see Judge Pence's opinion in the St.
Germain case, 413 F. Supp. 587, 594-604 (D. Hawaii 1976); and Galie, The Accelera-
tion Clause as a Truth in Lending Disclosure: The End of the Dilemma ?, 93 BANK.
L.J. 317 (1976). See also note 20, supra.
35. 319 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
36. Id. at 515. Cf. Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 257,
265-66 (3d Cir. 1975).
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Before the court in McCullen were the terms "extension of consumer
credit," "consumer purchaser" and "open-end credit or similar account"
from former R.S. 9:3509, repealed by the Louisiana Consumer Credit Law
of 1972. All three of the terms disputed in McCullen are now defined,
directly or indirectly, under the new law. 37
UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES
The Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law 38
declares that "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared
unlawful." 39 The quoted language is unmistakably patterned upon Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. By adopting the broad and
non-specific approach of the federal law the Louisiana legislature intended
that Louisiana courts should consider interpretations of the FTC Act by the
Federal Trade Commission and by the federal courts in determining the
scope and application of the Louisiana law, and the First Circuit Court of
Appeal of Louisiana has so held in Guste v. Demars.4 Whether, pursuant to
the well-established rule of statutory construction' recognized in Demars,
such federal interpretations are held to be "compelling," "persuasive," or
merely "relevant,''42 the Demars case clearly shows that the federal case
law brought to bear on the case under the Louisiana act is a two-way street.
Pursuant to the Louisiana act, the Attorney General sought in Demars
to enjoin a roofing contractor from representing to prospective customers
that its roofing work would be done in a "workmanlike manner" and from
guaranteeing the work. The action was premised upon complaints made by
three of defendant's customers to the Governor's Office of Consumer
Protection, the complaint in each instance relating to a defective roof
installed by defendant. The Attorney General cited the court to several
favorable FTC decisions involving misrepresentations and false guarantees,
but the First Circuit, in affirming the decision, was able to distinguish all
37. See LA. R.S. 9:3516(8), (10), (11), (13), (16), (18), (22), (23), (24), (25) (Supp.
1972).
38. LA. R.S. 51:1401 et seq. (Supp. 1972).
39. Id. § 1405(A) (Supp. 1972).
40. 330 So. 2d 123 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
41. See State v. Macaluso, 235 La. 1019, 106 So. 2d 455 (1958); Standard Oil Co.
v. Collector of Revenue, 210 La. 428, 27 So. 2d 268 (1946); Broussard v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 188 So. 2d 111, 119-20 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966); State v. Baddock,
170 So. 2d 5, 12 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
42. In the Demars opinion the First Circuit cites the Baddock case, 170 So. 2d 5
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1964), and seemingly treats the federal interpretations as relevant
and intended by the legislature as worthy of consideration.
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such cases, either on the basis that the defendant contractor had demon-
strated on numerous occasions the ability to perform roofing jobs in a
workmanlike manner, or on the basis that the alleged refusal to repair
defects was not indicative of a concerted effort to systematically defraud
consumers 43
THE LESSEE DEPOSIT LAW
In a prior symposium article this author noted that the lessee deposit
statute4 was unclear as to the requisite specificity of the lessor's reasons for
retention of all or any portion of a lessee's deposit. 5 The opinions of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in O'Brien v. Becker 46 and Lugo v. Vest47
have shed some light on that issue. Lessor in O'Brien responded in a timely
fashion to the written demand of former lessees for the return of a security
deposit of $50.00, but lessor refused the demand upon the basis that the
former lessees "did leave considerable damage." The court held that the
lessor failed to comply with the dual requirements of R.S. 9:3251 of an
itemized statement accounting for the retained proceeds 48 and a statement of
the reasons therefor. Accordingly, since the lessor had neither returned the
deposit nor furnished an itemized statement with reasons for retention in a
timely fashion, the court held that the failure to comply with R.S. 9:3251
was "willful" within the meaning of R.S. 9:3252. The decision may place
the Fourth Circuit at variance with the First Circuit's recent decision in Garb
v. Clayton-Kent Builders, Inc. ,49 in which it was held that a lessor's
retention of deposit as necessary to "clean and vacuum the apartment" was
43. On the facts, the Attorney General's case was less than solid--defendant
either offered to repair the leaking roof in each of the three complaint instances, or (as
the testimony revealed) stood willing to do so, but was not permitted to do so by the
homeowners in two of the cases, and apparently this was also true in the third. It
appeared then, that the court's refusal to enjoin the defendant could have been based
on either the inapplicability of the federal cases cited, or on the lack of evidence of
falsity of the representations. The reason for the Attorney General's action against
the defendant, however, may have had something to do with the fact that all three
complainants were women-presumably widows.
44. LA. R.S. 9:3251-54 (Supp. 1974).
45. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-
Consumer Law, 35 LA. L. REV. 384 & n.66 (1975).
46. 332 So. 2d 563 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
47. 336 So. 2d 972 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
48. Receipts for $173.15 for the expense of "general cleaning, painting and
repairing" the premises were attached to the lessor's letter in response to the tenants'
written demand, but the court dismissed the receipts as relating to normal wear
incident to over four years of occupancy of the subject premises.
49. 307 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
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sufficient under R.S. 9:3251 without a stated reason why the work was
necessary vis-a-vis "unreasonable wear. "50 The Fourth Circuit might find
such a response lacking in specificity, as in O'Brien. In addition, the Fourth
Circuit gave notice in the 1974 term in Calix v. Whitson5 that it would not
permit a "specious, arbitrary and capricious" reason for retention, regard-
less of specificity.
The answers of the lessor to interrogatories in O'Brien revealed that
the premises had been "damaged" by cigarette burns in the living room
carpet, mercurochrome stains on drapes and marks on the floor tiles in the
kitchen where a refrigerator had been located. As to the latter item of
damage the court concluded that the damage was not shown to have been the
result of unreasonable wear, but the former two items were apparently
resolved as a matter of the weight of the evidence without resort to the legal
issue of unreasonable wear. Given the apparent willingness of lessors to
contest the issue in the Louisiana courts of appeal even over relatively trivial
amounts of money,52 the issue of unreasonable wear seems certain to be
raised often in the future. Stained drapes and cigarette burns in carpeting
will be typical, perhaps, of the kind of lessor-lessee deposit squabble that
will send each party to the nearest Yellow Pages section of the telephone
directory.
The question becomes: What evidence that he has actually lived on the
premises may a lessee leave behind, without running afoul of the "un-
50. The Garb case is susceptible to criticism on two bases: first, the specified
"damage" appeared to be short of "unreasonable wear" and, second, permitting the
lessor to use the general language "clean and vacuum" would allow the very thing the
statute seeks to prevent-the arbitrary withholding of deposits, a purpose recognized
by the court itself. See id. at 815. The opinion in Garb does state that the "itemized
statement" language of the statute requires "categorical specification which reason-
ably apprises Lessee of the nature of the elements of wear and tear involved," id. at
815, and that what the law envisions is a separate listing of each aspect of wear and
tear such as painting, repair of wallpaper or plastered walls, repair to plumbing,
lighting fixtures or repair or replacement of broken or damaged items. The problem is
that some listings are descriptive in terms of "unreasonable wear" while others are
not. For example, "repair hole in wall," "replace broken window pane," and the
like, are descriptive in terms of unreasonable wear, but "clean and vacuum the
apartment," or "paint walls" are not so descriptive.
51. 306 So. 2d 62, 64 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
52. See O'Brien v. Becker, 332 So. 2d 563 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976) ($50 deposit;
lessee awarded $200 penalty plus $400 attorney's fees); Garb v. Clayton-Kent
Builders, Inc., 307 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975) ($50 deposit; lessee not
prevailing); Calix v. Whitson, 306 So. 2d 62 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) ($150 deposit;
lessee awarded $200 penalty plus $200 attorney's fee); Bradwell v. Carter, 299 So. 2d
853 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974) ($50 deposit; lessee awarded $200 penalty).
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reasonable wear" hurdle? Existing case law in Louisiana is of little aid on
the issue. 53 The Fourth Circuit in Lugo observed, in a case involving a
"damage" or unreasonable wear claim for three small holes in a rear screen
door, that the standard is flexible:
In each of these kinds of cases, the trial court, hearing the
testimony and observing the demeanor of the witnesses, has the
difficult job of drawing a fine line between the landlord's comprehen-
sible overzealousness in his own behalf and a calculated intention to
disadvantage an unsuspecting or unenlightened tenant. In such in-
stances, small differences in factual conclusions can, of course,
precipitate large differences in judicial result. Whether or not substan-
tial charges for the replacement of a few light bulbs and the patching of
a couple of small holes in screens falls into the first or the second
category is a determination properly left to the trier of the facts who
saw and heard the witnesses. We can conceive of situations where,
depending on the amount of rent charged and the kind of premises
rented, such charges might fall into the first category described instead
of the second. In this case at any rate, the able trial court has made a
determination that such "charges" triggered the application of the
protective provisions of the applicable statutes, and our review of the
record signals no compelling reason for us to substitute our judgment
for his. Quite the contrary, we are in agreement with him, for, in our
view, the record discloses a landlord who might, at best, be described
as arbitrarily overzealous and who might be more even handedly
described as clearly embarked upon the very conduct which LSA-R.S.
9:3251, et seq., seeks to proscribe.'
The Fourth Circuit may be developing the laudable theory that the listing of
normal items of maintenance such as holes in screen doors and replacement
of light bulbs are merely ploys by overreaching lessors, to be scrutinized
closely in the courts.
53. See Urban Management Corp. v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 263 So. 2d 404 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1972) (commercial lease). See also LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2719-23;
1974-1975 LA. OP. ATr'y GEN. 92 (1975).
54. Lugo v. Vest, 336 So. 2d 972, 973 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976).
